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From the moment we are born, we interact with our social environment. Longterm deprivation of social interaction causes uttermost despair and neural damage (Innocenti, 2007) , supporting the notion that human beings are innately social. The question of how "peoples' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others" is the focus of research in social psychology (Allport, 1985) . The long and fruitful tradition of social psychological research has produced a variety of empirical approaches and models concerning prosocial motives, emotions and behavior, as outlined in the other chapters of this book.
The field of neuroscience has only recently become interested in studying the affective and social brain. A new interdisciplinary field, social neuroscience, has emerged from a union of classical cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. Recent neuroscientific research has addressed classical social psychological issues such as peoples' ability to understand other people's minds: their beliefs, intentions, and feelings.
In the first part of this chapter we summarize the social neuroscience perspective on "understanding others" and describe some of the key research findings. The second part of the chapter discusses approaches and results related to the study of empathy and prosocial behavior in social and developmental psychology. The last part of the chapter provides a preliminary integration of the social neuroscience and social psychology perspectives and discusses implication for future research.
"Understanding Others" in Social Neuroscience
At first, social neuroscience focused mainly on the investigation of basic social abilities (for a review and overviews, see Adolphs, 1999 Adolphs, , 2003 Blakemore, Winston, & Frith, 2004; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001) . Several functional neuroimaging studies, for example, have investigated the neural correlates of attending, recognizing, and remembering socially relevant stimuli such as the facial expressions of fear, attractive faces, indicators of trustworthiness, racial identity, and faces of fair and unfair players in a game (Hart et al., 2000; Morris et al., 1996; O'Doherty et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004; Winston et al., 2002) .
More recently, social neuroscientists have begun to clarify the neural mechanisms underlying our ability to understand other people's beliefs and thoughts, an ability known as having a "theory of mind" (e.g., Premack & Woodruff, 1978) , "mentalizing" , "mindreading" (Baron-Cohen, 1995) , or "cognitive perspective taking"; and our ability to share other people's feelings, referred to as "empathy" (for a similar distinction between cognitive and affective aspects of reactions to other people, see Blair, 2005; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Singer, 2006) . Even though mentalizing and empathizing are often used in concert when we try to understand other people's minds, preliminary evidence from studies of patients with marked social deficits, such as autism or psychopathy, suggest that mentalizing and empathizing are two distinct abilities that rely on different neural circuitries (see also Figure 1 ; Blair, 2005; Singer, 2006) . For example, patients with autistic spectrum disorders often have deficits in cognitive perspective taking, while psychopaths are very good at understanding other people's 4 intentions and consequently at manipulating other people's behavior. In contrast, psychopaths lack empathy, which may be part of the reason for their antisocial behavior.
This dissociation points to an important difference between our ability to mentalize and our ability to empathize. Whereas both abilities play an important role in drawing inferences about other people's cognitive and emotional states, it has been suggested that empathy is not just a matter of cognition, but also has motivational, emotional, and social aspects (for a similar argument, see de Vignemont & Singer, 2006 The first statement is important because it differentiates empathy from theory of mind, cognitive perspective taking, and mentalizing. The term "mentalizing" connotes a person's ability to cognitively represent the mental states of others, including their affective states, without necessarily becoming emotionally involved. The term "empathizing" connotes the capacity to share other people's feelings. Accordingly, when one empathizes with another person who is in pain, one feels the other person's pain in one's own body. In contrast, when one understands someone else's thoughts, one does not feel the thought of the other in one's own body. There are no qualia attached to the representation of the other person's thoughts. This difference and its significance become clearer when we consider psychopaths: They do not have an impaired ability to understand other people's wishes, beliefs, intentions, and desires, but they seem to lack 5 the embodied feeling of empathy, which allows non-psychopaths to anticipate and appreciate others' suffering, thereby often preventing them from harming others. Thus, although psychopaths possess the ability to mentalize, they are not able to empathize (for a similar argument, see Blair, 2005) . Part b of de Vignemont and Singer's (2006) description of empathy is important in distinguishing "empathy" from "sympathy" or "compassion" (see Eisenberg & Miller, 1987 , for a similar distinction). In all three cases, we feel vicariously for the other person.
But when we "empathize," we share the other person's feelings; when we "sympathize" or show "compassion" we do not necessarily share the same feeling. For example, to use first-person language for a moment, when I empathize with a person who is sad, I feel sad myself. When I sympathize with or feel compassion for a sad person, I feel pity, love, or concern for the person but am not sad myself. Also, when I notice that someone is jealous or envious of me, I can sympathize with or show compassion toward that person, but I am not jealous or envious myself. Further, empathy is not necessarily linked to prosocial motivation -that is, a wish to maximize the other person's happiness or alleviate the other person's distress, whereas there is such a link from sympathy or compassion to prosocial motivation and actions or action tendences. Empathy can be misused, for example, by a torturer who empathizes to find his victim's weakest point, but he is far from showing compassion for the suffering person. Those reactions might be a precursor of the development of a capacity for empathy (see Sagi & Hoffman, 1976 ), but they are not considered empathic responses per se, because the babies are not aware that they are vicariously feeling another person's distress.
This discussion emphasizes the difference between perspective taking, the cooler, more cognitive apprehension of others' emotions, and empathy, which is a warmer, more embodied sharing of emotions perceived in another person. From the neuroscientific perspective, this distinction is expected to be reflected in differences in the neural systems involved in cognitive perspective taking and empathic sharing of emotions.
"Theory of Mind" Studies
Neuroimaging studies of cognitive perspective taking are often referred to as "theory of mind" experiments. In most cases, they are conducted with healthy adults, who are asked to understand the intentions, beliefs, and desires of a protagonist in a story or a cartoon (for a review, see Gallagher & Frith, 2003) . Theory of mind studies have consistently revealed a neural network comprising the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), extending into the temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and sometimes the temporal poles (TP). A schematic representation of the mentalizing brain network is shown in Figure 1 in green.
Interestingly, the mPFC is involved not only when people mentalize other people's thoughts, intentions, and beliefs, but also when people reflect on their own states 7 (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005a) . Jason Mitchell (Mitchell et al., 2002 (Mitchell et al., , 2005b (Mitchell et al., , 2006 recently conducted a series of experiments on mentalizing, which revealed functional differences between judging the mental states of similar and dissimilar others. A more ventral part of the mPFC was recruited when participants made self-judgments or judgments about people whom they perceived as being similar to themselves with respect to appearance or political attitudes. By contrast, a more dorsal part of the mPFC showed enhanced activation -close to the activation found in the mentalizing studies cited above -when participants judged the mental states of people perceived as being dissimilar to themselves. This suggests that we use two different strategies when inferring other people's mental states: With one strategy, we simulate the other person's states on the basis of knowledge we have about ourselves; with the other strategy, we infer the mental states of the other on the basis of more abstract knowledge about the world.
Studies of Empathy
While theory of mind research focuses on complex inferences about abstract mental states such as other people's beliefs, another line of neuroscientific research has focused on our ability to understand other people's goals and intentions by neuronally simulating them. This line of research is based on the ground-breaking discovery of "mirror neurons" in monkey premotor cortex, which fired both when a monkey performed hand movements itself and when it merely observed another monkey or a human performing the same hand movements (Ferrari et al., 2003; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) . Later on, a similar common coding of the perception and generation of motor actions was demonstrated in the human brain, using imaging techniques such as PET or fMRI (for a review, see Grezes & Decety, 2001 ). In line with the monkey studies, the human studies revealed that the same circuitry was recruited when participants merely observed another person performing an action and when they performed the same action themselves.
The idea that perception-action links in the brain enable us to understand others, a claim that was originally established in the motor domain, has recently been expanded to feelings and sensations (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002) . Indeed, fMRI studies in humans have provided evidence that such shared neural networks enable us to "share" pain, touch, or disgust with another person merely by perceiving or imagining the other person in a relevant situation, in the absence of any stimulation of our own body. For example, a study by Wicker et al. (2003) showed that viewing pictures of disgusted faces and smelling disgusting odors produced corresponding neural responses in viewers. Jabbi et al. (2007) had participants watch video clips showing people sampling pleasant and unpleasant tastes, and then experience the different tastes themselves. Both studies (Wicker et al., 2003; Jabbi et al., 2007) found neural activation in anterior insula cortex (see Figure 1) , a brain region involved in processing disgust and taste, among other sensations, when people passively watched disgust in another person and when they were disgusted themselves.
The majority of studies on empathic brain responses have been conducted in the domain of pain (Avenanti et al., 2005 (Avenanti et al., , 2006 Botvinick et al., 2005; Bufalari et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2007; Gu & Han, 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007; Jackson et al., 2005 Jackson et al., , 2006 Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Morrison et al., 2004 Morrison et al., , 2007 Morrison & Downing, 2007; Singer et al., 2004 Singer et al., , 2006 Saarela et al., 2007) . For example, in an early study, Singer and colleagues (2004) recruited couples and measured empathy "in vivo" by assessing brain activity in the female partner while painful stimulation was applied either to her own or to her partner's right hand via electrodes attached to the back of the hand.
The male partner was seated next to the MRI scanner and a mirror system allowed the female partner to see her own as well as her partner's hand lying on a tilted board in front of her. Before the experiment started, the couples were allowed to engage in social interaction to increase the feeling of being in a "real-life situation." Differently colored flashes of light on a screen behind the board pointed to either the male or the female partner's hand, indicating which of them would receive painful and which would receive non-painful stimulation.
This procedure permitted the measurement of pain-related brain activation when pain was applied to the scanned participant (felt pain) or to her partner (empathy for pain). The results indicated that parts of the so-called "pain matrix" -bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum -were activated when participants experienced pain themselves as well as when they saw a signal indicating that a loved one had experienced pain. These areas are involved in the processing of the affective component of pain -that is, the degree to which the subjectively felt pain is unpleasant. Thus, both the experience of one's own pain and the knowledge that a beloved partner is experiencing pain activate the same affective pain circuits, suggesting that if a beloved partner suffers pain, our brains also cause us to suffer from this pain.
Activation in this network was also observed when participants saw an unknown but likeable person suffering pain or watched videos showing body parts in potentially painful situations (Jackson et al., 2005 (Jackson et al., , 2006 , painful facial expressions , or hands being pricked by needles (Morrison et al., 2004 ; for a review, see de Vignemont & Singer, 2006) .
Analyses of empathic brain responses obtained while participants were observing other people suffering -be it their loved ones or people the participants liked (Singer et al., 2004 (Singer et al., , 2006 -have revealed individual differences in activity in empathy-related pain-sensitive areas (ACC and AI). According to the results of Singer and associates, these differences co-vary with scores on the Empathic Concern Scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980 ) and the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) . The higher participants scored on these questionnaires, the higher their activation in ACC and anterior insula. Interestingly, Jabbi et al. (2007) observed similar correlations between IRI subscales and empathic brain responses in the anterior insula among participants who had observed others tasting pleasant or unpleasant drinks associated with facial expressions of joy or disgust. Empathic brain responses are positively correlated not only with trait measures of empathy, but also with unpleasantness ratings given online after each trial of an empathyinducing task (Jackson et al., 2005; Lamm et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007) . Future research will have to clarify how these individual differences in empathic brain responses come about and whether they are able to explain individual differences in prosocial behavior, two lines of research which have not yet been sufficiently addressed.
"Understanding Others" in Social Psychology
In social psychology, the term most commonly used in the context of understanding others' emotional states is empathy. Depending on the focus of research, 11 different definitions of empathy have been offered. Hoffman (1981, p. 44 ) proposed a relatively broad definition: "an affective response appropriate to someone else's situation rather than one's own." He considered empathy to be the result of a developmental sequence, beginning with babies crying when they hear another baby's cry and arriving, after considerable development, at a clear sense of others as distinct from the self.
Perceived distress in the other can elicit "empathic distress" or "sympathetic distress."
The latter is the basis for altruistic motivation, which consists mainly of the urge to relieve one's own distress.
Eisenberg and her associates (see review in Eisenberg, Chapter 7, this volume) distinguish between empathy and sympathy. Empathy is defined as "an affective state that stems from the apprehension of another's emotional state or condition, and that is congruent with it" (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 91) . Sympathy is defined as "an emotional response stemming from another's emotional state or condition that is not identical to the other's emotion, but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for another's welfare" (p. 92). Empathy in its pure form is not other-oriented. With further cognitive processing it can turn into sympathy, personal distress, or a combination of both (Eisenberg, 2000) . Prosocial behavior is negatively correlated with personal distress, and positively associated with sympathy (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) . Sympathy can derive from empathy, but also from cognitive perspective taking. In children, empathic responding is observed in the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & King, 1979; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992) . It correlates with parents' expressivity, mediated by the level of the child's effortful control (Valiente et al., 12 2004) , and predicts measurable prosocial dispositions, which are stable across five years in early adulthood (Eisenberg et al., 2002) .
The term "empathic concern," introduced by Batson (see review in Chapter 1, this volume) is similar to Eisenberg's definition of sympathy. Empathic concern is defined as an other-oriented response congruent with the perceived distress experienced by another person (e.g., Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995) . It is elicited by adopting the other's perspective and requires valuing the other's welfare (Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007) . In many cases, similarity between the individual and the person in need increases empathic concern (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981) but is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005) .
Valuing the welfare of the other is also affected by similarity, and remains stable even after situational empathy has declined (Batson et al., 1995) .
In line with the results of Eisenberg and associates on children and young adults (e.g., Eisenberg, & Miller, 1987) , the findings of Batson and colleagues support the assumption that feeling empathy for a person in need leads to increased helping, one kind of prosocial behavior. Experiments have shown that most people are willing to receive uncomfortable electrical shocks themselves in order to help another person in need, even if they are offered an "easy escape" that would not require helping. Only people who report a high level of personal distress instead of empathy prefer to escape rather than help (Batson, 1991) .
What is the difference between someone who is empathic and helps, and someone who is distressed and opts to escape? One approach to answering this question is to identify personality traits that make up a "prosocial personality" (Penner, Fritzsche, 13 Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995; Penner & Orom, Chapter 3, this volume) . Penner and associates have identified two major components of a prosocial personality. The first concerns prosocial thoughts and feelings, such as a sense of responsibility and a tendency to experience cognitive and affective empathy. A second factor concerns being helpfulthat is, perceiving oneself as someone who is willing and able to help. Both factors are significantly associated with actual prosocial behavior, such as helping co-workers or volunteering in the community (e.g., Penner, 2002; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005) .
Another framework for investigating individual differences in empathy and prosocial behavior is attachment theory, proposed originally by Bowlby (1982) and elaborated and experimentally tested by Mikulincer and Shaver (2007; also Chapters 4 and 13 in the present volume). According to this theory, human beings are innately equipped with attachment and caregiving behavioral systems. The attachment system is especially apparent during the first years of life, but has also proven to influence social interactions across the life span (Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) .
Individual differences in attachment style can be measured along two orthogonal dimensions, attachment-related anxiety and avoidance (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) .
Relatively low scores on these dimensions indicate attachment security, which has been associated with empathy in young children (2 to 3 years old; Kerstenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe, 1989; van der Mark, van IJzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2002 ) and in adults (Mikulincer et al., 2001) . Increasing security by experimental techniques such as implicit and explicit priming has been shown to affect compassion and altruistic behavior (Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005) , whereas attachment insecurity can interfere with the natural tendency to help others in need Feeney & Collins, 2001 ; also Collins, Chapter 18, this volume).
Besides the influences of individual differences, the relation between empathy and actual prosocial behavior is influenced by social factors, such as whether the person in need is seen as a member of one's own or a different group (Dovidio, Gaertner, Johnson, Ashburn-Nardo, & Spicer, Chapter 20, this volume). There is a large body of evidence indicating strong favoritism toward members of one's group (e.g., Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) . Empathy is a better predictor of helping an ingroup member, probably because empathic concern is facilitated by familiarity and attachment, whereas prosocial behavior toward outgroup members is based on factors such as attraction (Sturmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005) . Taking the perspective of an outgroup member (Finlay, & Stephan, 2000) , however, or focusing on the person's feelings (Batson et al., 1997; Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003) reduces intergroup prejudice and bias (Dovidio et al., 2004) .
"Understanding Others" in Neuroscience and Social Psychology:
An Integrative Perspective
In both disciplines, empathy is seen as central for our ability to understand another person's emotional states, but does "empathy" have the same meaning in social neuroscience and in social and developmental psychology? In some social psychological definitions, empathy is viewed as an affective response that is congruent with (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) or appropriate for (Hoffman, 1981) another's emotion. Other definitions emphasize that empathy is related to adopting the other's perspective (e.g., Batson et al., 1995) . While affective empathic responses and perspective taking are often linked, the reviewed neuroscientific studies suggest a clear distinction between putting oneself into another's shoes (or mind: cognitive perspective taking) and sharing the other's affective state in an embodied manner (empathy). Accordingly, part of the conception of empathy in social neuroscience is based on its demarcation from cognitive perspective taking (Blair, 2005; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Gallese, 2003; Keysers & Gazzola, 2007; Singer, 2006) . This distinction is in line with early social psychological work, which also proposed a distinction between perspective taking and empathic concern (e.g., Coke, Batson, & Mc Davis, 1978) .
Although so far empathy research in the two disciplines has developed relatively independently, there is consistency between measures of empathy in social psychology and neuroscience. This is reflected by the covariation of individual scores on empathy questionnaires such as the IRI (Davis, 1980) and the BEES (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) with empathy-related activation of ACC and anterior insula (Singer et al., 2004 . Social neuroscience has taken only preliminary steps in investigating individual differences in empathy-related brain activity. But it is already clear that the neural empathy response is related to a participant's affective ties to the other person (Singer et al., 2004 (Singer et al., , 2006 , the participant's appraisal of whether the other person's suffering is justified , prior experience with the situation (Cheng et al., 2007) , and the intensity of the inflicted pain (e.g., seeing a needle pricking vs. penetrating a muscle, Avenanti et al., 2006) .
It would now be worthwhile to investigate whether differences in prosocial personality traits (Penner, 2002) or attachment styles (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) predict differences in activation of the brain network associated in social neuroscience 16 studies of empathy. There is already evidence that attachment-style differences in ability to suppress emotionally painful thoughts modulate brain activity (Gillath, Bunge, Shaver, Wendelken, & Mikulincer, 2005) .
Another focus for future research would be possible links between empathic brain responses, sympathy, and prosocial behavior. Based on current neuroscientific evidence it is difficult to decide whether empathic brain responses reflect feeling like the other person, in the sense of simulation the other's feelings, or feeling for the other, in the sense of sympathy. One way to disentangle the two would be to correlate empathic brain responses with nuanced situational self-reports, as already done in social psychology (for example, in distinguishing between empathy and personal distress). Moreover, social and developmental psychologists have designed clever experimental paradigms to investigate the links between empathy or sympathy and prosocial behavior, and some of these could be adapted for neuroscience experiments.
Working from the other side of the disciplinary divide, social and developmental psychologists might be able to avoid some difficulties in previous empathy research by using neuroimaging methods. For example, in many behavioral empathy studies, participants are repeatedly asked to report their feelings. This can be problematic, because it creates strong demand characteristics (Eisenberg, & Lennon, 1983 ) and may induce social desirability biases. Neuroimaging methods should be beneficial in such cases, because empathy and related phenomena can be investigated without such explicit instructions and self-observations (e.g., Singer et al., 2004 Singer et al., , 2006 . Moreover, neuroimaging methods can help to disentangle separate psychological processes, which may have similar behavioral correlates, yet be importantly distinct. For example, emotionally empathizing with or cognitively taking the perspective of another person can lead to the same behavioral outcome, but if they have different neural correlates they can be more carefully distinguised. Another interesting contribution of neuroscience methods is the quantification of changes in empathic response over the life span and as a function of empathy training or other interventions. For example, assessing the neural plasticity in empathic responses in children of different ages would add to our understanding of developmental aspects of empathy, complementing the already existing behavioral data.
Last but not least, our brains do not exist in isolation and their functioning should be modulated by the social factors and culture, on the "meso-level" of groups and the "macro-level" of society (Penner et al., 2005) . According to research in social psychology, ingroup and intergroup processes have strong effects on empathy and 
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have reviewed findings related to empathy and prosocial behavior from social neuroscience and social and developmental psychology. In the young field of social neuroscience, empathy research has focused on identifying brain regions and mechanisms involved in empathy and perspective taking, which leaves a variety of open questions concerning the sources of individual differences in empathic brain responses, the development of the empathic brain, and the links between empathic brain responses and actual helping behavior. Social and developmental psychologists have acquired expertise in these domains. We are convinced that integrating and linking the social neuroscience and the social and developmental psychology of empathy and prosocial behavior will be fruitful for both fields and will improve our understanding of a very important domain of human experience and behavior.. 
